Recent theoretical studies suggest that migration prospects can raise the expected return to human capital and thus foster education investment at home or, in other words, induce a brain gain. In a recent paper (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, Economic Journal, 2008) we used the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data set on emigration rates by education level to examine the impact of brain drain migration on gross (pre-migration) human capital formation in developing countries. We found a positive e¤ect of skilled migration prospects on human capital growth in a cross-section of 127 developing countries, with an elasticity of about 5 percent. In this paper we assess the robustness of our results to the use of alternative brain drain measures, de…nitions of human capital, and functional forms. We …nd that the results hold using the Beine et al. (2007) alternative brain drain measures controlling for whether migrants acquired their skills in the home or in the host country. We also regress other indicators of human capital investment on skilled migration rates and …nd a positive e¤ect on youth literacy while the e¤ect on school enrolment depends on the exact speci…cation chosen.
Introduction
Starting with Mountford (1997) , a recent theoretical literature has suggested that migration prospects can raise the expected return to human capital and thus foster education investment at home or, in other words, induce a brain gain. 1 To the best of our knowledge, the …rst paper to investigate this question empirically was our joint paper published in the Journal of Development Economics in 2001. This was a …rst but imperfect try since we had to use gross migration rates as a proxy measure for the brain drain due to the lack of comparative data on international migration by education levels. In a more recent paper (Beine et al., 2008) , we used the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data set on emigration rates by education level to examine the impact of brain drain migration on gross (pre-migration) human capital formation in developing countries. We found a positive e¤ect of skilled migration prospects on human capital growth in a cross-section of 127 developing countries, with an elasticity of about 5 percent. In this paper we assess the robustness of our results to the use of alternative brain drain measures, de…nitions of human capital, and functional forms. We …nd that the results hold using the Beine et al. (2007) alternative brain drain measures controlling for whether migrants acquired their skills in the home or in the host country. We also regress other indicators of human capital investment on skilled migration rates and …nd a positive e¤ect on youth literacy while the e¤ect on school enrolment depends on the exact speci…cation chosen. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and derives the main testable implications of the analysis. Section 3 summarizes the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data set, which we supplement with the brain drain estimates computed by Beine et al. (2007) , who controlled for immigrants' age of entry as a proxy for whether schooling was acquired in the home or in the host country. The empirical analysis is conducted in Section 4. We …rst discuss a number of econometric issues and then present the results for the benchmark model (our EJ results) as well as for alternative speci…cations, human capital measures, and brain drain indicators. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical and empirical framework
In this section, we develop a simple theoretical model describing the incentive mechanism related to skilled migration prospects. Then we describe how this model can be empirically tested. 2
Theoretical background
Consider a stylized small open developing economy where output is proportional to labor measured in e¢ ciency units 3 , Y t = w t L t . Due to exogenous inter-country productivity di¤erentials, the equilibrium wage rate in this economy, w t ; is lower than in the developed nations. At birth, individuals are endowed with a given level of human capital normalized to one. They live for two periods, and make two decisions: whether to invest in education during their youth, and whether to migrate in adulthood. There is a unique education program e. For an individual opting for education; the number of e¢ ciency units once adult is given by h > 1 while the cost of education, which is decreasing in personal ability, is denoted by c, a variable with cumulative distribution F (c) and density function f (c) de…ned on R + .
Once adult, people can emigrate to a high-wage destination with probability p for skilled workers and p for unskilled workers. As explained in our introduction, selective immigration policies, together with the tendency for migrants to positively self-select out of the general population, explain why emigration rates are much higher among the highly educated and skilled. For example, Docquier and Marfouk's (2006) data, detailed in Section 3 below, reveal that emigration propensities are …ve to ten times higher for workers with more than twelve years of education than for workers with less than twelve years of education. We will therefore assume that p >p. For analytical simplicity, we normalize p to zero. Also, in what follows we treat p as exogenous, as if it was the result of a relative quota set by immigration authorities in the destination country independently of the number of potential visa applicants. However, we could equally assume that a given number of visas is attributed, which can be translated into a probability of receiving an entry visa by agents with rational (in which case the adjustment is immediate) 4 or adaptative (in which case the subjective and objective probabilities only coincide at the steady state) expectations with respect to others' education decisions. 5 Individuals are assumed to be risk-neutral and maximize lifetime income. There is no intertemporal discounting of income. As explained, unskilled workers are assumed to remain in the home country and therefore earn the domestic wage w in both periods. In contrast, skilled workers have the possibility to migrate to a technologically more advanced country where the wage rate per e¢ ciency unit of human capital is w > w: They earn w c in the …rst period and then either w h if they migrate or wh if they don't. For a given migration probability p, the condition for investing in education is therefore:
and individuals will opt for education if
Clearly, migration prospects raise the expected return to human capital in the developing country, thus inducing more people to invest in education. The critical threshold c p;t is increasing in the probability of migration and in the wage di¤erential with the destination country. This suggests that the incentive e¤ect of migration will be stronger in poor countries. However, credit constraints on education investments are likely to be more binding in poor countries. To take this into account, we introduce a minimum threshold of …rst-period consumption, t , which must be …nanced out of …rst-period earnings. Hence, for any educated individual, it must be the case that w t c > t or, equivalently, that:
At the steady state (i.e., for w t = w t+1 ); the binding liquidity constraints condition may be written as:
We therefore impose the restriction that h 2 [1; 2] to allow for the possibility of either binding or non-binding constraints, depending on the value of w: It is clear from the last expression that liquidity constraints are more likely to be binding in poor countries (low w) facing high emigration rates (high p).
We denote by H a;t and H p;t respectively the gross or ex-ante (i.e., before migration occurs) and the net or ex-post (i.e., once emigration is netted out) proportions of educated in the population, which we take as a measure of the country's human capital level. The proportion of young agents opting for education is given by H a;t = F (c t ) where c t = M in(c p;t ; c l;t ) while the proportion of skilled adults remaining in the country is given by:
At the steady state, we have
Using the above expression, it appears that:
There is a possibility of bene…cial brain drain over some ranges of p providing that @Hp @p is positive at p = 0. This …rst requires that @Ha @p is positive (i.e., there is an incentive e¤ect), which implies that liquidity constraints are not binding in the closed economy;
At the margin, an increase in the rate of skilled emigration is good for human capital formation if @Hp @p is positive at the current emigration rate. Again, this …rst requires that liquidity constraint are not binding, but this time at the current level of p;
Finally, the total or net e¤ect of migration on human capital formation can be obtained by comparing the ex-post (or net) level of human capital with its counterfactual level in the closed economy solution,
There is a bene…cial brain drain if the net e¤ect is positive, that is, if H p > e H.
As explained, the realization of these conditions depends on whether liquidity constraints are binding as well as on the ability distribution. For illustrative purposes, let us consider the case of a uniform distribution: c U [0; 1] and assume < w 1 to avoid corner solutions. With a uniform distribution, H a = c = M in(c p ; c l ). Starting from a closed economy equilibrium, three con…gurations arise.
The most pessimistic one occurs when liquidity constraints are binding in the closed economy. In this case, when w(2 h) < (i.e., when the domestic wage rate is low), there can be no incentive e¤ect: @Ha @p = 0. Hence, any marginal increase in the skilled migration probability would generate a net loss:
Obviously, in this case the brain drain can only be detrimental (H p < e H). An intermediate con…guration arises when liquidity constraints are not binding in the closed economy but become binding once migration prospects are introduced. In this case, when w(2 h) > > w(2 h) ph(w w) (i.e., when the domestic wage rate is not too low and the migration rate is relatively high), a su¢ ciently small degree of openess can foster ex-post (or net) human capital if @Hp @p is positive at p = 0,
However, at the current migration rate, a marginal increase in p reduces the proportion of educated remaining in the economy as binding credit constraints do not allow for the incentive e¤ect to operate further ( @Ha @p = 0). The net e¤ect is positive (H p > e H) if the skilled emigration probability does not exceed the following critical value:
The most optimistic case arises when liquidity constraints are never binding, thus allowing for the incentive e¤ect to fully operate. In this case, obtained when w(2 h) ph(w w) > (i.e., when the domestic wage rate is high enough and the skilled emigration rate is su¢ ciently low), the condition for a su¢ ciently small degree of openess to foster net human capital formation is the same as in (4) and the net e¤ect is positive (H p > e H) when the skilled emigration rate does not exceed the following critical value:
Finally, the sign of @Hp @p evaluated at the current migration rate can be positive or negative depending on the wage di¤erential and on the magnitude of emigration. When p tends to one, clearly, @Hp @p is more likely to become negative. On the whole, our simple theoretical model predicts that migration prospects can stimulate the accumulation of human capital in developing countries under certain conditions: …rst, there must be an incentive e¤ect (or brain gain), and second, the latter must be greater than actual skilled emigration (or brain drain). The incentive e¤ect would seem to be potentially stronger in poor countries but may be limited there if liquidity constraints are binding. It is therefore a priori unclear whether poor or intermediate income countries experience the strongest incentive e¤ects and, consequently, it is also unclear which type of countries gain or lose more from the brain drain. In the rest of this paper, we will focus on the incentive e¤ect.
Related empirical model
To evaluate the incentive hypothesis described theoretically in (1), we use aconvergence empirical model and regress the growth rate of the ex-ante stock of human capital (i.e., including emigrants) between 1990 and 2000, ln(H a ); on a set of explanatory variables: ln(H a;90 00 ) ln(H a;00 ) ln(H a;90 ) (5) ln(H a;90 00 ) = a 0 + a 1 : ln(H a;90 ) + a 2 : ln(p 90 ) + a 3 :DEN S 90 +a 4 :SSAD + a 5 :LAT D + a 6 :RM 90 +
It is this human capital formation equation, Equation (6), that we estimate econometrically in Section 4.2. Together with the tautological equation de…ning the change in the ex-ante stock (Equation 5), it forms our benchmark empirical model. In Section 4.3, we will use non-linear variants by allowing the emigration rate, ln(p 90 ); to interact with dummy variables for whether the country's income per capita was lower than a given threshold in 1990. Such non-linear e¤ects are introduced to capture the role of liquidity constraints 6 .
The following explanatory variables enter in the estimation of Equation (6):
The log of the initial level of ex-ante human capital, ln(H a;90 ); to capture potential catching-up e¤ects. A negative sign for the coe¢ cient a 1 would indicate convergence in natives' (residents plus emigrants) human capital among the countries sampled.
The log of the skilled migration rate at the beginning of the period, ln(p 90 ); as a proxy for the migration incentives faced by educated individuals. Ideally, the incentive e¤ect of migration on human capital investment should be identi…ed through the impact of migration prospects on expected returns to education. However, these cannot be computed directly as there are no comparative data on education premia in developing countries. Using di¤erences in GNI per capita, on the other hand, raises endogeneity concerns as this variable is strongly correlated with human capital. In our benchmark model, we will thus let aside wage di¤erentials and di¤erences in GNI per capita and use instead ln(p 90 ): A positive sign for the coe¢ cient a 2 indicates that the incentive e¤ect operates (i.e., there is a brain gain).
The population density in 1990, DEN S 90 ; as a proxy for the cost of acquiring education. Clearly, education costs depend on a host of factors such as public expenditures on general and higher education, distances to schools, etc. However, public expenditures on education at the beginning of the sample period (in 1990) are statistically very highly correlated in our sample with the initial level of human capital H 90 : This certainly suggests that such expenditures are e¤ective, but the magnitude of the correlation (0.72) precludes any correct joint estimation of the impact of public expenditures and of possible convergence effects. Population density is likely to reduce distances to schools and, therefore, to decrease the opportunity cost of education.
Workers' remittances as a share of GDP, RM 90 , …rst because they can relax credit constraints on human capital investment, and second, because in the absence of statistics on return migration, they provide an indirect means of controlling for possible returns in subsequent periods. 7
Regional dummies for sub-Saharan Africa (SSAD) and Latin America (LAT D).
Data
3.1 Emigration rates by educational attainment (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006) Our benchmark empirical analysis is based on the (World Bank sponsored) Docquier and Marfouk (2006) (henceforth DM) dataset. DM collected data on immigration by education level and country of birth from nearly all OECD countries in 1990 and 2000, using the same methodology and de…nitions as Carrington and Detragiache (1998) but extending their work in a number of ways. First, census, register and survey data reporting immigrants'educational levels and countries of birth were used for 27 OECD countries in 2000 (which account for 98 percent of the OECD immigration stock) and 24 countries in 1990 (91 percent). For the few remaining countries for which census data were not available, existing data by country of birth were splitted across educational levels on the basis of the regional structure or of the OECD average. On this basis, Docquier and Marfouk (2006) obtained reliable emigration rates by education level for 195 emigration countries in 2000 and 174 countries in 1990. As for the Carrington and Detragiache's dataset, South-South migration is not taken into account; however, on the basis of census data collected from selected non-OECD countries, DM estimate that about 90 percent of all highly-skilled migrants live in the OECD area. The method used by DM is to rely on receiving country r 0 s census or population register to extract information on immigrants country of birth, age, and skill level. Let M r t;s denote the stock of working-age individuals born in a given country, of skill level s, s = l; m; h (for low, medium and high) and living in country r at time t. The stock of emigrants from a given country for a given education level, M t;s = P r M r t;s ; is then obtained by summing over receiving countries. Emigration rates by education levels are then obtained by comparing the number of emigrants to the population at origin with similar characteristics, N t;s . For each education category, emigration rates are given by
and its share among the total native population (residents and emigrants included) by
These steps require collecting data on the size and skill structure of the workingage population in the origin countries. Population data by age are provided by the United Nations. 8 Data are missing for a small number of countries but can be estimated using the CIA world factbook. 9 Population data are split across educational groups using international human capital indicators. The DM data set is based on the Lee (1993, 2001) estimates for most countries. For countries where the Barro and Lee measures are missing, DM transposed the skill structure of the neighboring country with the closest average school enrolment rate.
We measure the emigration rate of skilled workers as the emigration rate among individuals with tertiary education: p t = p t;h . As emigration rates are strongly increasing in human capital, we will also assume that the minimal or incompressible emigration rate is the one observed among people with primary education: p t = p t;l .
3.2 Brain drain estimates corrected for age of entry (Beine et al, 2007) The DM estimates are built according to a broad de…nition of "skilled immigrants" in that they include all foreign-born workers with tertiary schooling; for example, Mexican-born individuals who arrived in the US at age 5 or 10 and then graduated from US high-education institutions later on are counted as highly-skilled Mexican immigrants. In contrast, Rosenzweig (2005) suggests that only people with homecountry higher education should be considered as skilled immigrants. This must be considered as a lower-bound measure of the brain drain. Indeed, except for those arrived at very young age, most of the immigrants who then acquired host country tertiary education arrived with some level of home country pre-tertiary schooling. In addition, some of them would still have engaged in higher education in the home country in the absence of emigration prospects. 10 In Beine et al. (2007) we use immigrants' age of entry as a proxy for where education has been acquired and provide alternative measures of the brain drain by de…ning skilled immigrants as those arrived in the receiving country after age 12, 18 or 22. We use data on age of entry collected in a sample of OECD countries and then econometrically estimate the age-of-entry structure in the remaining host countries. Observations account for 75 percent of the data set and the remaining 25 percent were obtained by econometric estimation. The resulting corrected skilled emigration rates, which can be seen as intermediate bounds to the brain drain estimates, are by construction lower than those computed without age-of-entry restrictions by Docquier and Marfouk (2006) , which we take as our upper-bound brain drain measure.
The results for the year 2000 show that on average, 68 percent of the global brain drain is accounted for by emigration of people aged 22 or more upon arrival (the …gures are 78 percent and 87 percent for the 18 and 12 year old thresholds, respectively). For some countries there is indeed a substantial di¤erence between the corrected and uncorrected rates, with a minimal ratio between the two equal to 51 percent. Similar results were obtained for the year 1990. The correlation between the corrected and uncorrected rates is very high 11 and cross-country di¤erences are globally maintained in the corrected data sets. This should a priori mitigate concerns about children migration possibly leading to cross-sectional biases in the brain drain estimates and, consequently, about potential biases in the estimation of the incentive e¤ect of the brain drain using uncorrected data. This will be con…rmed empirically in Section 4.5 below.
Other data
Given that we focus on the brain drain impact on developing countries, our sample excludes high-income countries as well as countries from the former USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia (for consistency between the 1990 and the 2000 data points), which gives a total sample of 127 developing countries. The data sources for the other RHS variables in equation (6) and the alternative speci…cations (see below) are as follows:
Data on GN I and GDP per capita, population size (P OP t ) and population density (DEN S t ), life expectancy at birth (LE t ), workers'remittances (RM t ) and youth literacy rates (LIT t ) are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2005) . The GN I per capita is measured in US$, using the Atlas method. The GDP per capita is measured in constant 2000 US$.
Data on net school enrolment rates by schooling level (SE L t ; L = P; S; T for primary, secondary and tertiary schooling) and public education expenditures per student as percent of GDP per capita (EXP L t , L = P; S; T ) were provided by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (IUS), Montreal.
Data on racial tensions (RAC) come from the International Country Risk Guide (1984)
Regional dummies SSAD and LAT D are according to the commonly used World Bank classi…cation Dummies based on poverty rates (P OOR) are taken from the United Nations. We use the 1990-2003 average proportion of the population living with less than $1 a day.
Results
Before we carry out the estimations, we …rst address some speci…cation issues. Then we give the results for the benchmark model and for alternative speci…cations.
Econometric issues
A …rst important question concerns the exogeneity of the migration rate. When trying to determine the impact of migration on education, one has to control for the reverse e¤ect since, on average, the proportion of educated is likely to a¤ect the rate of skilled migration. This is due to a number of causes. First, as standard neoclassical models would suggest, a larger stock of human capital may reduce the skill premium and thus increase skilled migration incentives through higher international wage di¤erentials. However, a larger stock of human capital may also generate positive externalities on wages through a variety of channels emphasized in new growth and new economic geography models (see Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005) . Second, with an immigration system based on quotas by country (as was the case for the US system until 1965), the higher the supply of skilled workers in the source country, the lower their probability to emigrate.
In an attempt to cope with this endogeneity issue, recent empirical growth analyses (e.g., Sala-I-Martin, 1995, Hall and Jones, 1999) have been concerned with the use of truly exogenous instruments. In these studies, the following variables have been suggested as candidate instruments for a …rst-stage migration equation:
Life expectancy at birth (LE 90 ); as a proxy for general living conditions;
The country's population size (P OP 90 ), as small countries tend to be more open to migration. Also, following the above discussion on immigration quotas, it is clear that if visas are delivered on a country basis they are likely to be more binding in the case of large countries;
Racial tensions (RAC), a key traditional "push"factor;
The number of emigrants living in the OECD area at the beginning of the period (M T ), to capture the size of the migration network on which prospective emigrants can count on; 12 .
The GDP per capita of the source country, as a proxy for wage di¤erentialsclearly a driving force of migration.
We retain only two out of these …ve candidate instruments in our …rst-stage migration equation as we have to eliminate the variables for which there is a strong presumption of a correlation with human capital. This is the case for wage di¤erentials, for obvious reasons, 13 and for life expectancy, the exogeneity of which is questionable given the fact that longer-lived individuals can enjoy the bene…ts of education over a longer period of time. We also exclude racial tensions, for both technical and substantive reasons. Technically, their introduction would result in a signi…cant drop in the size of the sample used in the instrumental variable (IV) estimation, which would lower the comparability with the OLS results. 14 More substantively, it could well be that racial tensions impact on human capital formation, especially if ethnic discrimination is a serious issue. 15 We are therefore left with two instrumental variables: total population size, and migration stocks at the beginning of the period. At a theoretical level, there is no obvious reason why the demographic size of a country should be correlated to its education level. Likewise, there is no a priori reason why migration networks at destination should impact on human capital formation beyond their e¤ect on migration prospects and incentives (captured by our instrumentation equation). Since we have only one endogeneous explanatory variable, the number of instruments is large enough to test for exogeneity of the retained intruments using a standard overidenti…cation test.
At an empirical level, the validity of our instruments rests on two conditions: the instruments should …rst be signi…cantly correlated with the migration rate, and the exogeneity condition requires that they should be uncorrelated with the error term in (6). Equation (7) 
R 2 = 0:509; N obs = 127; F = 97:14:
The two instruments are signi…cant at the 1% signi…cance level and are therefore kept throughout the analysis. Interestingly, population size enters with a negative sign; this supports the conjecture mentioned above, according to which immigration restrictions are more binding for larger countries and, in turn, further justi…es the assumption that education decisions are taken in a context of uncertainty regarding future migration opportunities, as asssumed in the theoretical model. This is also in line with the general argument that small countries are more open to emigration. Note also that the sign of ln(M T ) is in line with intuition: a higher initial stock of migrants stimulates future emigration. Together, the variables ln(M T ) and ln(P OP ) account for more than 50% of the migration variability, which is quite satisfactory for a crosssection analysis. A more formal test relies on the value of the F statistics testing 14 More precisely, the sample size falls to 59 countries when racial tensions are added to the set of instruments. We still obtain a positive incentive e¤ect (of a higher magnitude) and conclude in favour of the exogeneity of the three instruments. The …rst-stage estimation also supports racial tensions as a strong instrument at the 10% signi…cance level. The results with this speci…cation are available from the authors upon request. 15 See Tremblay (2001) and Docquier and Rapoport (2003a,b) .
the null hypothesis that all coe¢ cients in (7) jointly equal zero. The test reveals that this null hypothesis is clearly rejected, suggesting that the two instruments are strong. Finally, given that we have more instruments than endogeneous variables, a J test of overidenti…cation was also run to assess the exogeneity property of the retained instruments, the p-values of which are reported in the result tables below. For the parcimonious speci…cation, the test supports the exogeneity assumption of the two instruments, thus providing additional con…dence that our instruments are indeed uncorrelated with the human capital variable.
The benchmark model
We now turn to the estimation of equation (6). Table 1 reports the estimation results for the full speci…cation and for a more parcimonious model from which insigni…cant variables such as LAT D, DEN S90 and REM 90 were excluded. Exclusion of the latter variable leads to a signi…cant increase in the number of countries included (from 103 to 127). The results appear to be very robust to the choice of speci…cation and of the estimation technique (OLS and IV): Skilled migration appears to signi…cantly increase gross (or ex-ante, or pre-migration) human capital stocks. The value of the migration coe¢ cient amounts to 0.0545 or 0.0565 for the OLS estimate (depending on whether the constant and the insigni…cant explanatory variables are included) and is slightly lower (0.0514 in the parcimonious regression) after instrumenting. 16 Taken literally, this means that doubling the migration propensity of the highly skilled increases gross human capital formation by 5 percent. This is not negligible in countries where the proportion of highly educated typically lies in the 2-8 percent range and higher education signi…cantly increases (by a factor of 5 to 10) one's chances of emigration.
Regarding the other control variables, we …nd evidence of convergence in human capital levels among the developing countries sampled. Indeed, the coe¢ cient on the lagged human capital stock is negative and signi…cant at the one percent threshold in all speci…cations. Moreover, in line with the …ndings of Easterly and Levine (1997) , we …nd that Sub-Saharian countries display poor performances in terms of human capital formation. In contrast, population density and the dummy variable for Latin-America do not seem to exert any signi…cant impact and are therefore omitted in the parcimonious speci…cations. Finally, workers' remittances are also signi…cant and, negative, which is consistent with a moral hazard story but also and maybe more importantly, raises endogeneity concerns. However, since we already instrument migration, instrumenting remittances raises methodological di¢ culties (see McKenzie, 2006) which are beyond the scope of this paper. In addition, including remittances has almost no e¤ect on the magnitude of the main coe¢ cients while their inclusion substantially reduces the size of the sample. For all these reasons, we usually leave remittances aside in our parcimonious speci…cations. While the overiden…cation test supports the exogeneity of the two instruments in the parcimonious speci…cation, the Hausman test does not support the need for accounting for reverse causality. The p-values associated with this test for the two speci…cations considered are indeed above the usual signi…cance levels (see Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 ). Regardless of the retained speci…cation and the estimation method, the coe¢ cient of the rate of migration is signi…cantly positive at a 5 percent level. The benchmark elasticity of human capital formation to skilled migration is obtained in column (2) of Table 1. In this best parcimonious speci…cation, we have a 2 = 5:65 percent. Using the standard error of the coe¢ cient, we can also provide an interval of con…dence at 95 percent for the elasticity. The lower bound for a 2 is equal to 0.86 percent and the upper bound amounts to 10.44 percent. Hence, the incentive e¤ect is de…nitely positive.
Alternative functional forms
Our empirical model is based on a particular log-linear speci…cation for the incentive e¤ect. From Equation (6), the parameter a 2 can be directly interpreted as the elasticity of human capital formation to skilled migration prospects. Let us now examine the robustness of the results to the speci…cation. For this purpose, we consider two alternative speci…cations where the incentive mechanism operates through either ln(1 + p 90 ) or directly through p 90 : ln(H a ) = a 0 + a 1 : ln(H a;90 ) + a 2 : ln(1 + p 90 ) + a 3 :DEN S 90 + a 4 :SSAD +a 5 :LAT D + a 6 :RM 90 + (8) ln(H a ) = a 0 + a 1 : ln(H a;90 ) + a 2 :p 90 + a 3 :DEN S 90 + a 4 :SSAD +a 5 :LAT D + a 6 :RM 90 + (9) Table 2 gives the results for these alternative functional forms. Column A recalls the results obtained from the baseline model. Columns B1 and B2 give the complete and parcimonious results obtained with the speci…cation (8). The constant is now sig-ni…cant and the controls which were already signi…cant in the benchmark model (i.e., the initial human capital level, the sub-Saharan dummy, the skilled migration rate and the amount of remittances) remain so. As justi…ed above, we eliminate remittances in the parcimonious regression. Clearly, the signi…cance level of the incentive e¤ect becomes much stronger once ln(1 + p 90 ) is used. However, the coe¢ cient a 2 can no longer be interpreted as an elasticity and does not allow for an easy interpretation of the magnitude of the e¤ect.
Columns C1 and C2 give the complete and parcimonious results obtained with the speci…cation (9). The constant is now signi…cant as are the controls which were already signi…cant in the benchmark model. Again, remittances are left aside in the parcimonious regression. The coe¢ cient on skilled migration as measured by p 90 is equal to 0.28. Taken literally, this means that a 10 percentage points increase in skilled migration increases the growth rate of human capital by 2.8 percentage points over a decade.
On the whole, the results with additional functional forms therefore point to a robust relationship between skilled migration prospects and human caiptal formation in origin countries. 
Testing for non-linearities
Until now, the regressions have assumed that the incentive e¤ect of migration on education is homogeneous across countries. However, one may be concerned about possible non-linearities in the relationship between migration prospects and human capital formation at di¤erent income levels. We allow for this possibility by interacting the skilled emigration rate in 1990, ln(p 90 ); with dummy variables for whether the country's income per capita was lower than a given threshold at the beginning of the period, GN ID 90 . We therefore augment the benchmark speci…cation by adding the interaction term ln(p 90 ):GN ID to the set of explanatory variables of equation (6), where GN ID is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country i is a low income country: ln(H a;90 00 ) = a 0 + a 1 : ln(H a;90 ) + a 2 : ln(p 90 ) + a 3 : ln(p 90 ):GN ID 90 +a 4 :DEN S 90 + a 5 :SSAD + a 6 :LAT D + a 7 :RM 90 + (10)
A negative sign for the coe¢ cient a 3 would suggest a weaker incentive e¤ect in poor countries, due maybe to binding credit constraints on education investment or the lower expected transferability of human capital in poor country. Obviously, robustness checks imply the use of di¤erent possible thresholds. We therefore interact skilled migration rates with a dummy variable for low-income status using three alternative threshold values of the 1990 GNI per head (500, 750 and 900 US$). The advantage of this speci…cation is that the correlation between the raw migration rate and the interaction term remains modest, which moderates the statistical e¤ects of collinearity. Table 3 reports the results with this speci…cation. As the Hausman test conducted above tended to con…rm the exogeneity of the migration rate, we only present the OLS results for the speci…cation with interaction terms. 17 On the whole, the results do not provide any evidence of a di¤erent impact for the poorest countries. In all regressions, the interaction term ln(p 90 ):GN ID is insigni…cant at usual signi…cance levels. Interestingly, the value of the migration coe¢ cient, ln(p 90 ); seems una¤ected by the inclusion of interaction terms. However, one may be concerned that in the absence of information on income distribution, average income levels may only imperfectly capture the extent of liquidity constraints. In unreported regressions, we also interacted skilled migration with a dummy variable P OOR for whether more than 40% of the country's population live with less than one dollar per day. As with the previous de…nition, no signi…cant di¤erences were found between poor and richer countries, leading us to conclude to the absence of non-linearities in the skilled migration-human capital formation relationship. One may be concerned that the positive incentive e¤ect emphasized above is due to a potential mismeasurement of the brain drain. Indeed, the DM estimates count as skilled immigrants all foreign born individuals independently of whether they acquired education in the home or the host country. In reality, some of them migrated at a very young age, bene…ted from the education systems in the receiving countries, and it is therefore disputable whether they should be considered part of the brain drain from their country of birth. As explained, this may lead to an over-estimation of the intensity of the brain drain as well as to spurious cross-country variation in the brain drain estimates.
To address this issue, we use the alternative measures of the brain drain of Beine et al. (2007) , where skilled immigrants are de…ned as those who immigrated after age 12, 18 or 22. Denoting by M J t;s the number of skilled emigrants who left their country after age J, we compute for each sending country alternative skilled emigration rates and human capital indicators as follows:
We then test models (6) and (8) using these alternatives measures. Table 4 describes the results. It may be seen that the incentive e¤ect is always positive and signi…cant. Recall that the elasticity of human capital formation to skilled migration was 5.65 percent in the benchmark model. As expected, this elasticity decreases as more skilled migrants are excluded according to an age-of-entry criterion. In the parcimonious models, it is equal to 4.2 percent, 4.2 percent and 4.3 percent after excluding migrants who left respectively before ages 12, 18 and 22. Nevertheless, the incentive e¤ect remains positive and highly signi…cant.
Note that the constant is always signi…cant and that the controls which were signi…cant in the benchmark speci…cation (i.e., the initial level of human capital, the sub-Saharan dummy, and the amount of remittances) remain so. The coe¢ cients and the R 2 are very stable across models. As may be seen from Colums B1 and B2 in Table 4 , similar qualitative results are obtained when combining the brain drain estimates controlling for age of entry with the alternative functional form (8) of the incentive e¤ect. Clearly, these results further support the robustness of the incentive mechanism. 
Ratio of skilled/unskilled emigration rates
In our theoretical model above, we normalized for analytical convenience the emigration prospects of unskilled workers to zero. However, the theoretical mechanism is based not so much on the absolute propensity of skilled workers to emigrate but on the relative propensity. Indeed, in a setting (as ours) where skilled premia are assumed constant across locations, the incentive to invest in education in a context of migration comes from the increase in the odds of migration for people with su¢ cient (tertiary) education. This aspect, while in the background of our discussion, has not been incorporated explicitly in our econometric analysis. To analyze the sensitivity of our results to the use of the absolute v. relative skilled emigration propensity, we consider an alternative speci…cation where the incentive mechanism operates through ln( p s 90 p u 90 ); with p s and p u standing for the emigration rates of skilled and unskilled workers respectively. As can be seen from Table 5 , the results with a relative measure of migration prospects are fairly similar to those obtained with the absolute measure. In particular, our main coe¢ cient of interest and its signi…cance levels are basically unchanged. 
Alternative measures of human capital investment
In this section, we test the incentive mechanism when alternative measures of human capital investment are used. In the benchmark model, we used the change in the proportion of tertiary educated natives (residents + emigrants) between 1990 and 2000. The regressions below are based on two other possible measures, namely, school enrolment and youth literacy rates (for the 15 to 24 year olds). The regression models become:
ln(SE L 95 ) = a 0 + a 1 : ln(SE L 1 90 ) + a 2 : ln(p L 90 ) + a 4 : ln(EXP L 95 ) +a 5 :SSAD + a 6 :LAT D + a 7 :RM 90 + (11) ln(LIT 95 ) = a 0 + a 1 : ln(EXP S 90 ) + a 2 : ln(p 90 ) + a 4 : ln(EXP L 95 ) +a 5 :SSAD + a 6 :LAT D + a 7 :RM 90 +
where SE L 95 is the 1995 net rate of school enrolment at education level L (L = T; S; P for tertiary, secondary and primary education), SE L 1 90 is the 1990 enrolment rate at schooling level just below L (except for primary education), EXP L 95 is the amount of public expenditures in US$ per student at education level L, and LIT 95 is the youth literacy rate in 1995. The variable p L 90 stands for the emigration rate of individuals who emigrated after graduating in their country (i.e. after age 22 for L = T , after age 18 for L = S and after age 12 for L = P ). Table 6 describes the results. The left panel of Table 6 gives the results for school enrolment, …rst with the speci…cation in (11) (in Columns T1, S1 and P1) and then with ln(1 + p 90 ) instead of ln(p 90 ) (in Columns T2, S2 and P2). The right panel of Table 6 describes the results obtained for the regressions using (12) and the same functional forms as above.
Regarding school enrolment, we do not …nd any evidence of an incentive e¤ect of skilled emigration when using the log-linear speci…cation (11). The coe¢ cient associated to the skilled emigration rate is never signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. This is consistent with the results of Faini (2003) , who found a depressing but not signi…cant e¤ect of tertiary emigration on domestic enrolment in higher education. However, when we use ln(1 + p 90 ) instead of ln(p 90 ), the e¤ect of skilled migration becomes signi…cant, with a negative impact on tertiary schooling and a positive impact on secondary schooling. Finally, public education expenditures are not signi…cant, except for secondary enrolment. The enrolment rate is strongly determined by the lagged enrolment rate at the lower level. The sub-Saharan dummy is always highly signi…cant.
Regarding literacy rates, however, we …nd strong evidence of an incentive e¤ect whatever the speci…cation used, with an elasticity of about 4.5 percent.
Coming back to school enrolment, how can we explain that, depending on the speci…cation used, school enrolment rates are either not a¤ected by skilled migration prospects while the other measures of human capital investment are, or that they are negatively a¤ected (for tertiary school enrolment) while the others measures of human capital investment are positively a¤ected? A …rst explanation could be that school enrolment data raise more measurement problems than human capital stock data as the latter result from an aggregation of ‡ows and are therefore less subject to periodical measurement errors.
A second explanation is suggested by Faini (2003) , who attributes his …nding of a potentially depressing e¤ect of skilled emigration on tertiary and secondary school enrolment to the choice of would-be migrants to pursue their studies abroad. Our …ndings are di¤erent as they show either no impact (with the ln(p 90 ) speci…cation) or a signi…cant incentive e¤ect at the secondary level and a negative e¤ect at the tertiary level (with the ln(1 + p 90 ) speci…cation). The latter is consistent with a story where skilled migration prospects lead more students to invest in secondary schooling at home to buy and then exercise the option of studying abroad at the upper level, an interpretation we do not want to push too far given the lack of robustness of the results. Note also that while our main measure of human capital formation (the change in the proportion of highly educated among natives) accounts for return migration of skilled migrants, school enrolment indicators do not, which could also go part of the way towards reconciling the two approaches. HK in 1990 (logs) -0.235 -0.233 -0.236 -0.232 (6.56)*** (6.29)*** (7.29)*** (7.48)*** Sub-Saharan African dummy -0.449 -0.447 -0.449 -0.446 (4.08)*** (4.30)*** (4.26)*** (4.40)*** Latin American dummy -0. Finally, a third interpretation is that the positive e¤ect on natives'human capital investment emphasized in our benchmark regressions and beyond results from the age distribution of the population in sending countries. Indeed, developing countries are characterized by important turnover rates, with young and better educated workers enterring massively into the labor force. If the turnover rate is for whatever reason higher in countries with high skilled emigration rates, this will induce a spurious mechanism leading to overestimate the strenght of the incentive e¤ect. We address this issue in Table 7 where we control for the share of workers aged 15-24 and 55-64 in the benchmark regression. These demographic shares are never signi…cant and do not distort the results.
Conclusion
The brain drain has long been viewed as a serious constraint on poor countries development. However recent theoretical literature suggests that migration prospects can raise the expected return to human capital and foster gross (pre-migration) investment in education at home. This paper empirically assesses the robustness and magnitude of this incentive mechanism, also referred to in the literature as a "brain gain". We …rst reproduced our benchmark speci…cation, as appeared in Beine et al. (2008) , where we found evidence of a positive e¤ect of skilled migration prospects on human capital investment in a cross-section of 127 developing countries. In that benchmark model, we measure human capital formation by the log variation in the proportion of highly-skilled workers among the native labor force. The elasticity of human capital growth to skilled emigration prospects was found to be in the neighborhood of 5% and was very stable across speci…cations and estimation methods (OLS and IV). In this paper we check the robustness of these results and obtain similar qualitative resuts when using alternative brain drain estimates controlling for whether migrants acquired their skills in the home or in the host country and when using a relative (instead of an absolute) measure of migration propensity. We also regressed other indicators of human capital investment on skilled migration rates and found a positive e¤ect on youth literacy while the e¤ect on school enrolment depends on the exact speci…cation used. Notwithstanding the latter …nding, which still needs quali…cation, and within the limits of a cross-sectional analysis, our results point to a robust, positive and sizeable e¤ect of skilled migration prospects on human capital formation in developing countries.
